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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MELVIN H. JENSEN, 
Plainti.tr, 
vs. 
MANILA CORPORATION OF THE 
CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF 
LATTER-DAY SAINTS, a Cor-
poration Sole, and JOHN 
TINKER and GENEVIEVE L. 
TINKER, his wife, 
Defendants, 
Case No. 14806 
REPLY BRIEF 
ARGUMENT 
Appellant MANILA CORPORATION makes the following 
p o i n t s : ' r."*oJ" t~ *r; C: -<-. - <- - r o u ; ^ ^v^ez 
- sponaer . >i£,~ , - " JENSEN. 
POINT ONE 
"^ E PAROLh! EVIDENCE RULE BAKb RESPONDENT'S 
CLAIMS m^ RECOVERY. 
Respondent ' s answer \ -iv. • -;
 3• =, - • JI t-. - D . * 
p o i n t Cc rt- :>y way of a t t e m p t i n g to d i s t i n g u i s h une r e c e n t c a s e 
o f P e r c i v a l v s . Cooper, 523 P . 2d 4 ; fUtat 1974) c i t e - ry 
a p p e l l a n t 'and p ic- •:*:. ; ^ _ aer c a s e or d i n e 
v s . H a r p e r , 118 I-a ' - - . - J22 : ~ , 2 G ? T I <:„tah 1 9 5 0 ) . 
Respondent argues t h a t Pe^rciyal 11:« - --on t x o l 1 i n g 
.<:^ .-r because i i ;ar> on ly be c o n s i d e r e d xn 
sect ion - tr u e t ac t s or tha t case . " i t xs true that 
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the closer a cited decision is on all fours with the 
facts in the case for which it is being cited the more 
persuasive it is as precedent. Nevertheless, the rule of 
stare decisis, by its very nature, permits some differences 
in facts between the two crises to occur and yet allows 
the one case to be binding authority for the other. More-
over, contrary to respondent's assertions, the case of Per-
cival is very much on all fours with this present action 
and the principles enunciated in that case fully and com-
pletely cover the situation at hand here. In Percival 
the land described in the document of conveyance was mea-
sured in terms of so many feet by so many feet, exactly as 
was true here. In that case this Court held that the 
description was unambiguous. Also in Percival the buyer 
by using simple mathematics would have known exactly what 
he was getting, namely less than a half acre of land. In 
this case a simple measurement by the respondent, who after 
all by his own testimony was a prominent builder and 
developer, would have established exactly whether the 
land described in both the earnest money offer and, more 
importantly, in the subsequently executed real estate 
contract was the same size as the land he thought he was 
acquiring. 
Respondent also claims that in Percival there 
was a meeting of the minds, "unlike the case presently 
before the Court." That is an incorrect statement of the 
-2-
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holding of Percival. The Court in that case never had to 
reach the question whether there was a meeting of the 
minds since the document conveying the land was clear and 
unambiguous. On the other hand, Justice Crockett dissented 
in that case specifically because, to him, the evidence 
showed that the sellers either were mistaken as to what 
property they intended to sell or they fraudulently mis-
represented the size of the property to the buyers, in 
which case there was never a meeting of the minds. In the 
present case, as it has been shown clearly by affidavit 
and by testimony, the seller never intended to convey a 
piece of property larger than approximately one-third (1/3) 
acre and more specifically one hundred feet by one hundred 
fifty feet (100 ft. x 150 ft.). Nor was there ever any 
evidence that the seller attempted to defraud the pur-
chaser into thinking that he, the buyer, was getting more 
land than the seller had available. As in Percival, there 
is here no need to reach the question of a meeting of the 
minds, because of the unambiguous document involved. 
But if such is argued, it is answered by the fact that 
both the seller and the buyer intended that the property 
to be conveyed would be a parcel one hundred feet by one 
hundred fifty feet (100 ft. x 150 ft.). 




 Percival case and the instant case and yet is perfectly 
willing to overlook the many differences between the Sine 
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< 
case and the present case and to claim that Sine and not 
Percival is binding upon the Court on the facts of this , 
case. An application of respondents own definition 
of precedent defeats any use by him of Sine. In that 
case seller actually had additional land available for 
sale, which is not true here. Further there is evidence 
in that case that the seller intended to convey the addi-
tional property sought by the buyer, which is clearly not 
the case here. Finally, and most importantly, in Sine 
the description of the premises to be conveyed was fairly 
ambiguous, referring as it did only to a street address 
which was in the executed earnest money offer. Even the 
real estate contract perpetuated the use of the street 
address. In this case, the property was described in the 
earnest money offer not in terms of an address, although 
it was classified as the "abandoned LDS chapel," but more 
specifically in terms of the acreage involved. It should 
also be borne in mind that the only document executed 
by the parties in binding form was the contract of Novem-
ber 1, 1965, which specifically described the property 
involved. The earnest money agreement, described as exhibit 
D-4, although signed by both parties, was specifically 
made subject to the final approval of the Church's Law 
Department in Salt Lake City, which approval was never 
placed on the earnest money agreement. 
* * * * * * 
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Since the facts in Sine are inapposite to the 
facts in this case, the conclusion reached in that case 
that reformation should be allowed is clearly not-appli-
cable here. Nevertheless, the general principles laid 
down in Sine, just like the general principles laid down 
*
n
 Percival, both in the main opinion and in the dissent, 
are applicable here. If that were not true, the Court in 
Percival would have had no other alternative than to over-
rule the holding of Sine. That they did not do so nor 
even need to do so comes because the basic principles 
remain the same, namely, that only where there is mutual 
mistake or mistake on part of one and fraud on the part of 
another can a court intervene and apply parole evidence to 
reform the contract in question. The further rule as announ-
ced by Percival is that where the document on its face is 
clear and unambiguous, parole evidence should not be allowed 
to change the terms of the document. This is for the good 
and basic reason that if a document is clear and unambiguous, 
its very simplicity argues against any claim of mutual 
mistake or fraud. This is the clear holding in Percival 
since, as the dissent in that case points out, there appeared 
to be some evidence of mutual mistake or fraud despite 
the clear and unambiguous nature of the document sought 
to be reformed. In the case now before the Court, however, 
there is, first of all, a clear and unambiguous document 
and, secondly, no evidence or indication that there was either 
-5-
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mutual mistake or fraud involved. 
With the clear precedent of Percival the lower 
court erred in not granting appellant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and erred further in not ruling in favor of appel-
lant at the conclusion of the trial of the case. 
POINT TWO 
EVEN IF PAROLE EVIDENCE IS ALLOWED, THERE IS NO 
BASIS FOR REFORMATION. 
To establish the intent of the seller in selling 
the property in question, testimony was obtained from the 
person who, at the time of the transaction, was the only 
member or officer of the appellant corporation. He was 
the corporation sole and as such was the only person to 
speak for the corporation. This power of the corporation 
sole to act by himself and without authority from others 
or without a board of directors is amply provided in Utah 
Code Ann. §16-7-1, et. seq. 
The testimony of the said corporation sole, 
Albert Neff, was unequivocal that prior to offering the 
land for sale he had looked up the deed to determine the 
measurements of the property to be sold. He calculated 
that the Church had very close to a third (1/3) of an acre. 
(Tr. 73) He also was aware that a survey would be neces-
sary to establish exactly how the property fit on the 
land. At no time did he think that the property the 
Church was selling was all that within the fences because 
-6-
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he knew that "fences'* don11 indicate property at all here 
in Manila," (Tr. 74) His further testimony is he indi-
cated to Mr. Dan Brown, the realtor involved, that there 
should be a survey because of such problems. (Tr. 73) 
Hence, the only person who was authorized to say what the 
appellant corporation knew, thought, or intended testified 
unequivocally that all of the land described in the contract 
of sale executed by the parties was exactly the land which 
the corporation intended to sell and no other. 
There is argument by respondent that the realtor 
conveyed a different impression to the seller than appel-
lant intended, hence a mutual mistake was created. Evi-
dence of the understanding of an agent is only useful 
on this point, however, if that is a way to determine the 
actual intent of the principal at the time in question. 
Cf. Janke vs. Beckstead, 8 Utah 2d 247, 332 P.2d 933(1958). 
On the other hand, in this case the true intentions of the 
appellant were introduced into evidence. Nor was there 
any testimony which contradicted what Mr. Neff said with re-
gard to what he understood as to the size and boundaries of 
the property in question. Equity in such a case asks not 
whether an agent can bind a seller to complete a sale, but 
rather what the true intention of the parties was at the time 
of the execution of the document of transfer. 66 Am Jur 2d, 
Reformation of Instruments §23. What the agent understood 
in this case does not at all reflect what the appellant 
-7-
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understood and intended. Hence there was no mutual mistake. 
Since there was no mutual mistake and since there 
was no evidence submitted by the respondent making any 
claim for fraud, to allow the parole evidence submitted 
at trial to come in this case would not permit reformation 
of the contract* Respondent argues in his brief on this point: 
"What is relevant is not what they [the corporation sole and 
the realtor] knew, even assuming that that was the case, 
but what they represented to the respondent." Respondent's 
Brief, Page 9. That respondent is incorrect in his state-
ment is clear from the cases heretofore cited. 
Even so, respondent received from the realtor 
an earnest money offer which he signed, which described 
the property as one-third (1/3) of an acre. The respondent 
also signed the real estate contract which specifically 
described the property. It should also be kept in mind, 
contrary to the inferences found on Page 10 of Respondent's 
Brief, that at no time did appellant own a parcel in 
this area larger than one hundred feet by one hundred fifty 
feet (100 ft. x 150 ft.). It is true that between the 
time respondent signed the earnest money offer and the time 
the contract in question was executed appellant exchanged 
property with a neighbor in order to correct a mistake in 
property lines. But that exchange of property gave appel-
lant no more property than it previously had. Hence, if 
what respondent is saying is that the property which should 
-8-
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be conveyed to him is that which appellant held title to 
at the time of respondent's signing the earnest money agree-
ment, respondent still would be getting less property 
than he seeks in the action at hand, 
POINT THREE 
RESPONDENT'S RELIEF, IF ANY, WOULD BE RESCISSION 
AND NOT SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. 
Respondent's position has always been that it is 
entitled to reformation of the document and enforcement of 
the document in question as reformed. It is clear however 
that since appellant does not hold title to any other 
property than is described in the contract in question, 
respondent's recourse was for rescission and for damages. 
Respondent however did not ever ask for rescission and has 
had only one theory, namely, specific performance. More-
over, the lower court granted only ONE DOLLAR ($1.00) in 
damages on which point respondent has not chosen to appeal. 
Therefore, respondent is not entitled to require appellant 
to grant by warranty deed property to which appellant does 
not hold title. 
POINT FOUR 
RESPONDENT WAS GUILTY OF LACHES. 
Respondent makes the claim on Page 11 of his Brief 
that the reason he did not file suit sooner was because the 
parties were attempting to get the matter resolved. This 
is also claimed as the reason why he was late in making 
-9-
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his payments. However, as Appellant's Brief amply points 
out, and as the documents admitted to by respondent so 
clearly show, any problems of which respondent had know-
ledge were not conveyed to any representatives for appel-
lant until late in 1969. Nonetheless, the payments for 
1966, 1967, 1968, and 1969 were all late and the payment 
for 1970 was never made* If the problems with the real 
estate description was the cause of his late payments, 
respondent never made those problems known to the appellant 
until at least late in 1969. Moreover, once the problems 
were made known to appellant, and after some discussion of 
resolution of the same which never came to fruition, res-
pondent nonetheless let the matter lie until after appellant 
had taken legal action against respondent. 
Respondent argues that appellant's claim of 
laches must fail for lack of showing of damage or preju-
dice to appellant by reason of respondent's delayed bringing 
of the lawsuit. Such damage or prejudice, however, is 
easily established. If the lower court's ruling were 
sustained, appellant would have an action against the 
realtor, Dan Brown, for negligence or improper represen-
tations in handling the sale of the property in question. 
All of Mr. Brown's activities for appellant occurred in 
May of 1965 or before, however, and it was not until 
November or December of 1969, more than four (4) years 
later, that respondent even made appellant aware of any 
-10-
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problems, although he knew of the same at least several 
years earlier. Hence any claims appellant would have 
had against Brown are barred by the Statute of Limitations. 
/ Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25. All of the above is supported 
by the evidence submitted in this case. Clearly there has 
been damage or prejudice to appellant because of respon-
dent's inaction. 
POINT FIVE 
APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO A FORFEITURE OF THE 
REAL ESTATE CONTRACT OF SALE. 
Forfeiture i s the proper remedy in this case 
inasmuch as the appropriate notices were sent and ignored. 
Respondent argues that i t was given no opportunity to cure 
the delinquency. Contrary to the statement in Respondent's 
Brief on Page 20, the or iginal notice sent to respondent 
served on respondent on June 24, 1975, says tha t i f del in-
quent payments, including delinquent taxes, penal t ies , 
a t torney 's fees, and costs of the action, are not paid as 
of June 30, 1975, by the hour of 5:00 p.m. "said contract 
wi l l be forfeited by you [respondent] to the said Manila 
Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints effective as of said time and date ." The second notice 
dated July 16, 19 75, and served on respondent July 17, 19 75, 
indicates that because he did not correct the delinquency, 
he had therefore forfeited his r ights in the property and 
was therefore a tenant a t w i l l . The forms used (Exhibits 
- 1 1 -
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i 
A and B of Appellant's Request for Admission) are standard 
in Utah and give the full notice required by the contract 
pursuant to which they were sent and served. 
With regard to the claim that respondent's loss would 
be too great if the property inquestion were forfeited, that 
is a matter which is to be weighed by this Court. However, 
it is submitted that because of the unusual delay by respondent 
in paying for the property in question, because of the benefits 
which respondent has derived from the property, including re-
ceiving the rent from the property on a daily and monthly basis, 
(Tr. 39, 40) and weighing all of the other facts of the case, 
it is not unconscionable for this Court to declare a forfei-
ture of the property and to> consider the amounts paid in as 
liquidated damages. Jensen vs. Nielsen, 26 Utah 2d 96, 485 
P.2d 673 (1971) . 
SUMMARY 
Appellant has never had more than a one hundred 
by one hundred fifty feet (100 ft. x 150 ft.) piece of 
property available to sell in Manila, Utah. Despite 
respondent's claimed expectations, appellant knew that it 
had no more property to sell than the one hundred by one 
hundred fifty feet (100 ft. x 150 ft.) parcel. It would be 
manifestly unjust and improper for this Court to find that 
respondent can now insist that appellant convey to him not 
only the property described in the contract, which is 
clear and unambiguous ,,.but also property to which it does 
-12-
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not hold title. Furthermore, appellant properly gave 
notice to respondent of the extreme deficiencies in the pay-
ment of the amounts due under the contract, which notice 
respondent chose to ignore even though respondent was 
given an opportunity in which to cure the deficiency. 
Appellant therefore should be entitled to enforce its 
forfeiture of the property and have this Court reverse 
the ruling of the lower court and quiet title to the par-
cel in the appellant. 
this 6? day of March, 1977. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIRT0N, McCONKIE, BOYER & BOYLE 
DATED 
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